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SUMMARY
In this study we quantified the rate at which classical swine fever had been transmitted by
several different types of inter-herd contact during the 1997–8 epidemic in The Netherlands.
During that epidemic 428 CSFV-infected pig herds were detected, 403 of which were include in
this study. The estimated rates of transmission were 0–065 per shipment of live pigs, 0–011 per
contact by a pig transportation lorry, 0–0068 per person contact, 0–0007 per dose of semen,
0–0065 per contact with a potentially contaminated pig assembly point, 0–027 per week per
infected herd within a radius of 500 metres and 0–0078 per week per infected herd at a distance
between 500 and 1000 metres. These transmission rates can be used to optimize the strategy to
stop future epidemics of CSF in The Netherlands. In addition, the analysis demonstrated in
this paper, can be used to quantify CSFV transmission rates from other epidemics.
INTRODUCTION
Classical swine fever (CSF, hog cholera) is a disease of
pigs that is caused by CSF virus (CSFV), which
belongs to the genus Pestiirus. The symptoms of the
disease include fever, lethargy, anorexia and con-
junctivitis [1]. In addition nervous symptoms, res-
piratory disorders, diarrhoea or fertility disorders
may occur. The severity of the clinical signs and the
mortality depend on, for example, the virulence of the
CSF strain and the age of the infected pigs. Regions
containing CSFV-infected pig populations are sub-
jected to trade restrictions worldwide.
Whenever CSF is detected on a pig farm in one of
the member states of the European Union (EU) an
eradication programme is implemented immediately
[2]. Because in the 1980’s it was decided not to use
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vaccination [3], the programme consists of pig move-
ment restrictions and rapid diagnosis and destruction
of infected herds. However, despite this strategy CSF
epidemics have occurred frequently within the EU
[4]. A recent disastrous example was the epidemic
caused by CSFV strain Paderborn during 1997–8 that
affected the pig populations of Germany, The Nether-
lands, Belgium, Spain and Italy. In The Netherlands
alone, this epidemic resulted in the destruction of
almost 11 million pigs. Meuwissen et al. [5] estimated
the total costs of the epidemic in The Netherlands at
2–3 billion Euro. Because epidemics of CSF can lead to
such a mass destruction of pigs and high financial
losses to the society, the strategy to free the European
pig population from CSFV needs improvement. For
that purpose, better understanding of the virus trans-
mission between herds is useful.
The transmission of CSFV between pig herds is
determined by the rate at which the agent is trans-
mitted in case of contact between an infected herd and
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a susceptible herd. In addition, the number of contacts
per unit of time and the number of herds that are in
contact with each other are important [6]. As a conse-
quence, if the probability of CSFV transmission by the
different types of inter-herd contacts and the contact
structure between pig herds is known, the quantitative
contribution of each different type of contact to the
overall inter-herd transmission can be established.
Such knowledge would be very helpful to design sets
of measures that efficiently eliminate the virus.
Many papers have been written on the possible role
of different types of contacts in inter-herd CSFV
transmission. Often, the distribution of the most likely
routes of viral transmission has been reported (see [4]
and [7] for reviews). However, the transmission rates
of contacts by these routes cannot be estimated from
those papers, because the total number of contacts
between infected and uninfected herds were not
reported and in case a herd was exposed to CSFV by
more than one route it is unclear by which route virus
had been introduced. Also from the studies by Koenen
et al. [8] and Bernard et al. [9], it is impossible to
estimate CSFV transmission rates for different types of
contact. This is because the risk factors in those
studies either are not really to transmission routes
(for example the density of pigs in an area), or the
contacts included in the study were not restricted to
those contacts originating from infected herds (for
example number of contacts by a transport lorry as a
risk factor instead of only the number of contacts by
a transport lorry that previously visited an infected
herds). Finally, Staubach et al. [10] and Laevens [7]
reported the odds ratio’s (OR) of the relation between
the probability of a herd getting infected and the dis-
tance to an infected herd. However, the interpretation
of these OR’s in the above context assumes that
there is a certain base-line rate at which infected herds
arise ‘spontaneously’. This is not biologically plausible
for infectious diseases. Additionally, the authors
assumed that susceptible herds in a neighbourhood
were only exposed to virus by a primary outbreak.
However, secondary outbreaks also emitted virus into
the neighbourhood and thus the OR’s have probably
been overestimated (see [11] for an explanation).
Thus, although many papers have been written on
the possible role of different types of contacts in inter-
herd virus transmission, the actual rates at which the
virus was transmitted by these types of contacts have
never been quantified. The purpose of this study was
to estimate the rate at which CSFV had been
transmitted by several different types of inter-herd
contacts during the 1997–8 CSF epidemic in The
Netherlands.
METHODS
Data
This study was based on data collected during the
CSF epidemic in The Netherlands that took place
between February 1997 and May 1998. A general
overview of that epidemic has been written by
Stegeman et al. [12]. A total of 429 pig herds were
diagnosed as CSFV-infected during the epidemic.
Shortly before depopulation, samples for virus iso-
lation and antibody detection had been collected in all
compartments of these herds according to a standard
protocol [13]. On the basis of the results of these
samples, for each herd a probability distribution of
the day of virus introduction had been constructed in
an earlier study [14]. Thus, in that study the time of
virus introduction of infected herds had been esti-
mated independent of the contacts of that herd, which
is essential for the analysis presented here. From the
herd specific probability distributions we obtained the
day of virus introduction for each individual herd by
use of Monte Carlo simulation. Nineteen herds were
excluded from the study, because we were unable to
estimate the date of infection as described above and
we also assume that they did not play a role in the
transmission of CSFV between herds (see [14] for
explanation). In addition, seven other herds were
excluded from the analysis, because the method to con-
struct the probability distribution of the day of virus
introduction into populations of breeding pigs was
based on the serological observations and registered
contact pattern of these herds [15]. As a consequence,
the results of these seven herds could not be used to
estimate the rate of CSFV transmission per contact
independently from the contact structure. We assumed
that the infectious period of infected herds started one
week after the introduction of the virus. The reason for
this delay is that, introduction of infected animals
excepted, the virus first has to infect one or more
animals and it subsequently takes 4–6 days before
these animals start to excrete virus. The infectious
period ended on the day the herd was depopulated.
Shortly after the diagnosis CSF had been confirmed
by the reference laboratory, official veterinarians
traced the forward contacts of each infected herd [13].
This resulted in a list for each infected herd that
included all contacts specified by date, type and
identification number of the ‘recipient’ herd. The
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Table 1. The rate at which classical swine feer irus was transmitted from an infected to a susceptible herd by
arious types of contact during the 1997–8 epidemic in The Netherlands
Type of contact Definition No. of contacts Rate of transmission (95% CI)
Live pigs Shipment of pigs 172 0–0647 per contact
(0–0043–0–1251)
Lorry Lorry that has been used to transport
pigs of an infected herd subsequently
visits an uninfected herd on the
same day
3123 0–0110 per contact
(0–0014–0–0206)
Person Person, in contact with pigs, that has
visited an infected herd subsequently
visits an uninfected herd on the
same day, mutual use of equipment
is also included in this type of
contact in the same manner
2468 0–0068 per contact
(0–0007–0–0129)
Artificial Insemination (AI) Single dose of semen from an infected
boar centre that is transferred to a
pig breeding herd
25505 0–0007 per dose
(0–0002–0–0012)
Assembly point Lorry that goes to an uninfected herd
after leaving an assembly point
where pigs of an infected herd have
been brought to be killed (buying
out)
1876 0–0065 per contact
(0–0000–0–0133)
Rendering Pick up service of the rendering plant
has picked up a dead pig from an
infected herd and subsequently picks
up dead pigs from uninfected farms
10102 0–00002 per contact
(0–00001–0–00003)
D0-500 During one week an infected herd
located within a radius of 500 metres
of an uninfected herd
4014 0–0270 per infectious herd per
week (0–0176–0–0364)
D500-1000 During one week an infected herd
located within the zone between 500
and 1000 metres of an uninfected
herd
7649 0–0078 per infectious herd per
week (0–0037–0–0119)
D1000-2000 During one week an infected herd
located within the zone between
1000 and 2000 metres of an
uninfected herd
18375 0–00006 per infectious herd per
week (0–00004–0–00008)
Manure Manure of an infected herd has been
spread over the land that borders on
the farm, or mutual use of
equipment to transport manure
173 *
Feed Lorry from the feed company has
brought pig feed to an infected farm
and subsequently brings feed to an
uninfected farm
146 *
* Not in final multivariate statistical model, because P" 0–10.
different types of contact that were recorded and the
definitions of these types of contact are listed in Table
1. The reasons why the types of contact listed in Table
1 were chosen in this study are as follows. Live pigs,
lorries, persons (also including materials) and manure
have all been reported as possible modes for CSFV
transmission [1]. Recently, artificial insemination (AI)
has been added to this list [16] and because two boar
centres had become infected during the epidemic, AI
was included as a contact in this study. In addition,
Elbers et al. [4] suggested that CSFV could be
transmitted by the pick-up service of the rendering
plant, whereas the same could be true for lorries of the
feed company. Furthermore, Pluimers et al. [13] and
Bernard et al. [9] suggested that virus had been
transmitted by lorries used to partly depopulate
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overstocked farms for welfare reasons. The three
distance related variables in Table 1, D0-500, D500-
1000 and D1000-2000, actually are not contact types.
However, because in recent epidemics quite often no
contact between an infected herd and a previously
infected herd has been traced [4, 17–19] and earlier
studies [7, 10] indicated a relationship between the risk
of a herd getting infected with CSFV and the distance
to an infected herd, these variables were included in
the study.
From the lists of contacts of the infected herds
during their infectious period, we constructed a table
of contacts for each pig herd (infected and uninfected)
that had been in contact with an infected herd at least
once. In this table the rows are the weeks of 1997 and
1998 and the columns are the numbers of contacts
specified by type. Each cell of the table was filled with
the number of contacts of a certain type that took
place in that specific week. Finally, a column was
added to the table that included the probability that
CSFV had been introduced into the herd in that
specific week (1 if the day of virus introduction was in
that week, otherwise 0).
Data analysis
If k is the rate of virus transmission per contact, than
the probability of virus transmission equals 1fie−k
(see e.g. [20]). For each contact type k was estimated
by means of a multivariate generalized linear model,
using a binomial error distribution (GLM) [21]. After
an idea by Becker [22] the probability that a herd
escaped from infection in a week (e−k) was the
dependent variable in the model and the above
mentioned numbers of the different types of contacts
in a week were the independent variables. In the
analysis, the random and systematic components of
the model were linked by a log function and as a
consequence the outcomes of the model are the values
of fik of the different types of contact (ln(e−k)).
Furthermore, we did not fit a constant in the model,
because in that way the outcome is an actual rate
instead of an OR against a base-line transmission rate.
Starting with a model that included all dependent
variables, the variables with a type I error (a) larger
than 0–1 were excluded from the model one at a time,
starting with the highest a (stepwise backward
elimination). The effect of a variable was considered
significant if a was smaller than 0–05. The fit of the
model was investigated by plotting standardised
residuals against predicted values.
RESULTS
The numbers of contacts between infected and
susceptible herds that were traced are shown in Table
1. The variables feed (Pfl 0–48) and manure (Pfl
0–51) were eliminated from the model in the stepwise
backward elimination. The rates of transmission of
the contact types included in the final model and their
accompanying 95% confidence intervals are shown in
Table 1. The rate of transmission by animal contacts
was highest, followed by the rate of transmission
associated with an infectious herd within a 500 meters
radius of a susceptible herd for a period of 1 week.
However, the total number of contacts of the latter
contact type was much higher. Consequently, the
overall contribution of these so-called neighbourhood
infections to the epidemic was higher than the
contribution of animal contacts. The rate of CSFV
transmission at D500-1000 is significantly lower than
the rate of CSFV transmission at D0–500. Although
the contact type assembly point remained in the final
model, its rate of transmission did not differ signifi-
cantly from zero at the desired a level of 0–05 (Pfl
0–060). In addition, even though the estimated rates of
transmission of the contact types rendering and
Dl000-2000 were significantly larger than zero, the
magnitude of these estimates in relation to the number
of contacts makes the contribution of these types of
contact to the CSFV transmission negligible.
DISCUSSION
In this study we quantified the rate at which CSFV
had been transmitted by several different types of
inter-herd contacts during the 1997–8 epidemic in
TheNetherlands.Although the estimated transmission
rates were generally low, most of the contact types
studied had a transmission rate significantly larger
than zero. As a consequence, the results of this study
indicate that shipments of live pigs, lorries, persons,
AI and neighbourhood infections contributed to the
1997–8 CSF epidemic in The Netherlands and they
also indicate the magnitude of these contributions.
The study described here is unique, because, to our
knowledge, it is the first time that the actual rates at
which CSFV had been transmitted during an epidemic
by different types of inter-herd contact have been
quantified. The multivariate GLM enabled us to
estimate these transmission rates from the data
collected during the epidemic, while taking into
account that a herd may have been exposed to CSFV
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by several ‘competing’ contacts. Usually, from CSF
epidemics the distribution of the most likely routes of
virus introduction (types of contact) is reported
[4, 18, 23–25]. However, when several possible routes
of transmission for an outbreak had been traced, an
arbitrary choice of the most likely one was made in
those studies. Thus, the observed distributions depend
heavily on the a-priori ranking of the importance of
the different routes of transmission. Furthermore,
those studies only reported the number of contacts
between infected and uninfected herds that resulted in
transmission of CSFV, not the number of contacts
that failed to transmit the virus. As a consequence, the
rate of transmission could not be estimated from the
results of those studies.
The rates of transmission as observed in this study
are generally low. However, one should realize that
most of the contacts registered took place when it was
known that CSFV was present in the country. This
awareness probably urged farmers to take actions that
reduced the probability of virus introduction by most
of the types of contact under study. As a consequence,
the transmission rates presented in this study most
likely are an underestimation of the transmission rates
of those same types of contact during periods before
an epidemic is detected. However, in this study the
amount of data available of that period in the
epidemic was too small to make separate estimates. In
addition, the rates may have been underestimated
because not all of the information that was recorded
may have been correct because of recall bias. Despite
the low transmission rates, a huge epidemic of CSF
occurred. The reason is that the total number of inter-
herd contacts that had been traced was very high. This
is even more striking, because the number of contacts
may have been underreported because of recall bias.
In addition, CSFV may have been transmitted by, yet
unresolved, contact types not included in this study.
Although it has been shown that CSFV can be
transmitted by AI under experimental conditions [16],
until now there was no proof whether this had
actually happened in the field. This is because most
herds that received potentially contaminated semen
had also been exposed to CSFV by other types of
contact. However, the results of this study showed
that AI contributed to the number of outbreaks of the
epidemic, because the transmission rate is significantly
greater than zero. It can be ruled out that the variable
AI is entwined with the person who inseminates the
sows, because the vast majority of the farmers
(" 90%) inseminates the sows themselves. In ad-
dition, in case a person of the boar centre inseminated
the sows instead of the farmer, this person was
included in the analysis as a person contact.
The transmission rate associated with lorry contact
indicates that removing pigs from herds in regions
under movement restrictions for welfare reasons
contributes to the inter-herd transmission of CSFV.
Although not significantly different from zero at the
level of afl 0–05, the transmission rate associated with
the contact type assembly point further stresses the
risks to spread CSFV by welfare slaughter. These
findings support other reports that have suggested the
risk of transmitting CSFV in the process of welfare
slaughter [9, 13].
Table 1 shows that the distance related variables
D0-500 and D500-1000 contributed most to the
transmission of CSFV between herds and that the
probability of CSF infection decreases as the distance
from an infected herd increases. Staubach et al. [10]
and Laevens [7] showed previously that the risk of
CSFV infection increases when a herd is located closer
to an infected herd. However, the results of Staubach
et al. indicate that such neighbourhood infections
only play a role within 350 metres of an infected herd,
whereas the results of Laevens suggest that in large
herds (" l000 pigs, as was common in our region)
neighbourhood infections may easily exceed a distance
of 1000 metres. Our results indicate a role of neigh-
bourhood infections within a l000-meter radius of
an infected herd. However, because the mechanisms
behind neighbourhood infections are still poorly
understood, it is not clear whether the results of these
three studies are in conflict with each other. In
addition, the number of infected pigs in a herd and the
time between introduction of the virus and detection
of the infection may also influence the relation
between the distance to an infected herd and prob-
ability that a susceptible herd becomes infected.
The transmission rates estimated in this study can
be used to optimize the CSF control in the pig dense
parts of The Netherlands. Stegeman et al. [14] showed
that a policy that consisted of diagnosing and
depopulating infected herds as soon as possible after
detection resulted in an inter-herd reproduction ratio
(R
h
, average number of secondary infections caused
by one infected herd) of 1–3. To stop an epidemic this
value needs to be smaller than 1. In the 1997–8
epidemic this was eventually achieved by extending
the eradication programme with the policy to de-
populate herds that had been in contact with infected
herds preventively (pre-emptive slaughter). In that
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way R
h
was reduced to 0–5. However, given the
transmission rates estimated in this analysis, the effect
of different strategies to reduce the number of inter-
herd contacts and implement pre-emptive slaughter
on R
h
could be estimated by a modelling study.
Subsequently, a cost benefit analysis could indicate
the optimal control strategy.
It is unclear to what extent the results of this study
can be extrapolated to epidemics in other regions.
Due to differences in procedures, the amount of virus
transferred during contact, and thus the rate of CSFV
transmission, may vary from one region to another. In
addition, we cannot exclude that other factors, for
example the virus strain that causes the epidemic,
influence these rates. However, the analysis demon-
strated in this paper can also be used to study inter-
herd transmission of other epidemics of CSF. In that
way more knowledge would be gathered concerning
the variation associated with the rates of inter-herd
transmission of CSFV by different types of contact.
Such knowledge could help to improve the CSF
control strategy within the EU. Another interesting
part of future work is research into the factors that
influence the rate at which the different types of
contact transmit CSFV. Finally, more efforts should
be directed to elucidate the mechanisms behind the
distance related spread of CSFV. This could further
help to develop effective control strategies that are less
dependent on the massive killing of healthy pigs in the
framework of pre-emptive slaughter.
This study demonstrates that the rate at which
CSFV is transmitted by different types of contact can
be estimated from data collected during an epidemic,
while taking into account that herds are at risk for
CSFV introduction by several contacts. The estimated
rates of transmission during the 1997–8 epidemic of
CSF in The Netherlands were 0–065 per shipment of
live pigs, 0–0l1 per contact by a pig transportation
lorry, 0–0068 per person contact, 0–0007 per dose of
semen, 0–0065 per contact with a potentially con-
taminated pig assembly point, 0–027 per week per
infected herd within a radius of 500 metres and 0–0078
per week per infected herd at a distance between 500
and 1000 metres.
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